Economic and Financial Review
Volume 42

Number 1

Article 3

3-1-2004

Determinants of public sector wages in Nigeria
Moses Kpughur. Tule

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.cbn.gov.ng/efr
Part of the Labor Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Tule, M. K. (2004). Determinants of public sector wages in Nigeria. Economic and Financial Review, 42(1),
54-84.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CBN Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economic and Financial Review by an authorized editor of CBN Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact dc@cbn.gov.ng.

DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES
IN NIGERIA
BY
MOSES KPUGHUR TULE

1

ABSTRACT
An efficient wage policy entails a clear understanding of the
behavioral interactions in the domestic labour market. These
may involve understanding the constraints of the labour market
including demand and supply determinants and employee
preferences for certain wage levels. In Nigeria, the way and
manner of determining public sector wages presents no
determinable pattern. Existing studies were deficient on data
and methodology This paper discusses the determinants of
public sector wages in Nigeria. Using quarterly time series
data for 1970-2001, and employing the error correction
methodology, the paper identified Trade Disputes, Cost of
Living, previous Work Experience and Productivity to be the
main determinants. It found the wage level to be inadequate for
a decent standard of living, and noted the effects of
inappropriate wages on public sector productivity to include
personnel attrition, labour freelancing as well as corruption. It
similarly identified a strong influence on wages of prices, trade
disputes, previous work experience, and public sector deficit
spending. The paper recommends amongst other things, the
payment of a clean wage to public sector employees (given
marginal tax rates) and a review of the failed Public Sector
Pension Scheme which was found to be the major cause of
corruption in the public sector. To address the issue of
constant price increases associated with policy slippages,
measures to stem incessant price volatility were suggested.
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INTRODUCTION

Wages are a major issue of economic policy, and therefore,
an integral part of economic development policies of most
countries. At the centre of public wage policy are the rate of wage
increases, range and structure of wage differences, degree of
desirable or tolerable inequality, adequacy of the wage for the
varying differentials of skills and responsibilities, and the extent of
variance between wage groups. Also, of importance is the extent to
which labour is to be treated as an overhead cost, or alternatively to
which labour costs and earnings should vary with output.
Evidently, the composition of wages in public sector
employment has not been a crucial factor in the determination of
wages nor in formulating wage policies in most developing
countries, as this has often been taken for granted (Becker: 1964
and Mincer: 1958, 1974). This is due to the absence of an
appropriate methodology for classifying attendant paraphernalia of
public office and the non-monetization of benefits of public
servants. This makes the definition of wages in the public sector a
complicated issue. The question of how education and work
experience influence wages and the stagnation of wages by public
policy to contain inflationary pressures and minimize public sector
expenditure, remain unanswered. Other issues are whether the
premium between public and private sector wages can reasonably
be narrowed by efficient public sector wage policies as Heller and
Tait (1983) and Levy and Newman (1989) have alleged.
An efficient wage policy demands a clear understanding of
1.
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the behavioral relationships in the domestic labour market. Thus,
issues such as what the constraints of the market are, the relevance
of supply in wage determination, the conditions under which
employers would prefer a certain wage level to another, need to be
clearly understood. In attempting to address these issues, the
pertinent question is whether government wage fixing exercises
can be justified when theory suggests that in efficient markets,
supply creates its own demand and establishes the market
equilibrium?
This paper seeks to establish the determinants of public
sector wages in Nigeria. To achieve this, the paper is organized in
five sections. While Section I presents the introduction, Section II
reviews the underlying the oretical and empirical literature. In
Section Ill, a historical review of the determination of wages in
Nigeria is undertaken. Section IV presents the empirical findings
and analyses, while section five summarises and concludes the
paper, and adumbrates some policy recommendations.
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SECTION TWO
2.0

Theoretical and Empirical Literature

In a free market economy, wages are considered as a special
case of the general theory of value. They are the price for labour,
which in the absence of control is determined, like all other prices
by the forces of demand and supply. However, labour is not
demanded for its own sake, but for its intrinsic value in the
production of other goods which consumers pay a monetary value
for. Besides, the demand for labour is a derived demand, and the
special properties of the derived demand may thus reasonably be
assumed as a part of the general theory of wages.
An important consideration is the difference in the efficiency
of labour and sometimes the aggregation of wage payment without
due consideration for its differentials. In a simplified model of the
labour market, wages are in equilibrium when labour demand
equals supply, implying that an excess of supply over demand
induces unemployment. The unemployed will then ask for lower
wages to regain employment. If demand exceeds supply,
employers will be unable to obtain all the labour they need and will
therefore offer higher wages in order to attract labour.
Economic theory believes wages to be a function of price of
labour. The wage determines how much people are willing to do,
and how much labour to be employed. This belief is anchored on
the behaviour of the profit maximizing firm. A competitive firm will
hire workers up to the point where the value of the marginal
productivity of labour equals the wage rate. Aggregating for all
firms, the economy's profit-maximizing identity will be the same as
that of the individual firms; given as:
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w = pXnor

Where w is the nominal wage rate, p is the price level, w/p is
the real wage rate, and Xnis the marginal productivity of labour. The
Xn, derived from the production function is assumed to be positive
but declines as employment increases in accordance with the
assumptions of diminishing marginal productivity.
When money wages rise, the cost of employing an additional
worker over and above his marginal productivity would rise, thereby
causing a reduction in employment. Similarly, if the price of output
(goods) rises, the value of the marginal output of labour would rise.
The classicists believed that the supply of labour depends on the
real wage level just as does the demand. Thus, workers are not
better off when both wages and prices double. If however under
the circumstances, better-off, they are said to have a money illusion.
The theory suggests that persistent unemployment is ascribed to
imperfections in the labour markets which prevent a fall in money
wages. They assume that such a fall would lower the real wage and
establish equilibrium.
Keynes and the Keynesians argued that money wages tend
to be sticky downwards even when involuntary unemployment
exists, and that even if money wages fall, the real wage will remain
constant and therefore, involuntary unemployment will not be
eliminated and thus, equilibrium will not be established. They
reasoned that a fall in money wages would temporarily reduce the
real wage rate, increase production and consequently,
58
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employment. This argument is based on institutional facts that
wages are not generally downwardly flexible even under conditions
of heavy unemployment. Keynes maintained that money wages
would be inflexible downward even in the absence of unions,
minimum wage laws, and similar elements that prevent competition
in the labour market.
While workers will not accept a fall in money wages, through
wage cuts, they are indifferent if such reductions came about
through a rise in the price level. Although this is money illusion, it is
important to note how the fall in real wages is brought about.
Equilibrium requires that the needed reduction in real wages be
brought about by an increase in aggregate demand, which will
induce an upward price rise, thereby shifting the labour supply
curve inwards to eliminate unemployment. Aggregate demand,
therefore, determine the conditions in the labour market in
Keynesian economics, whereas in the classical case, the labour
market takes care of itself.
Theoretically, wage increases should reflect increased
productivity because they are expected to leave labour cost per unit
of output unchanged and therefore, not exert upward pressure on
prices. To be relevant, wage increases should be economy wide
rather than sectoral based to avert lopsided development. It would
be inappropriate to regiment wage increases to changes in average
productivity, though that may provide a shield against inflation
because it indicates the general trend of wages that are tolerable
without increase in the unit cost of labour. Where productivity
increases are commensurate with wage increases, business markup or some combination of these two, would induce inflationary
pressures.
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There are associated problems of measurement of individual
productivity especially in the public sector. Even in the more
austere private sector, measurement problems are concealed in the
attainment of corporate goals. The public sector however, has no
such goals with which to measure its achievements nor the
productivity of its employees. Thus, tying wage increases to
changes in average productivity would not always be socially
expedient. However, the theoretical usefulness of this approach is
its safeguard against inflation as it indicates the general trend of
wage rates that can be tolerated without an increase in unit labour
cost. Discarding this theoretical construct creates structural
bottlenecks and infrastructural deficiencies, which have engulfed
the public and private sectors in Nigeria (FOS, 1997).
Often, while the public sector maintains high employment,
real wages are gradually eroded. Mazumdar (1987) found that
when government wages are too high, they tend to exert upward
pressure on private sector wages thus compromising employment
and labour efficiency. Low wages in the public sector create a
discouraged and disenchanted workforce leading to moonlighting
activities (a situation where persons in full employment engage in
parallel activities that are inconsistent with their primary employment
for commercial gains). This has negative impact on the productivity
of the public sector. Moreover, wages in the private sector follow
the pattern dictated by the public sector.
Most studies dealing with the adequacy of wage suffer from a
suspect methodology, consequently, their findings lack credibility
and are adjudged to be misleading. A number of studies dealing
with wage determinants make comparisons between the public
and private sector on the basis of average wages without making
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provision for adjustment for differences in the level of education and
work experience between the private and public sector and the
reason for their existence. For instance, Mincer (1994) found that
educational attainment does respond to wages, and that this
response mitigates the trend towards higher wage premiums for
college educated workers.
Thus, studies by Abbot and Stanos (1986), Gunderson
(1979c) , Robinson and Torres (1984), Shapiro and Stekner (1980,
1986) as well as Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986) in Canada and the
United States, using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
techniques to control wage determining attributes (such as
education, productivity and experience) in assessing the public
and private sector wage differentials and adequacy found different
results from those obtained in developing countries. Becker (1964)
and Mincer (1958, 1974) adopting the human capital model of
earnings determination, found that observed wage differences
among individuals arise from a mix of school and post school
investments in education, training , work experience as well as other
socio-economic factors like marital status, geographical location
and nationality.
Typically, these studies estimate sector specific wage
equations which allow us to test statistically for the equality of
overall pay structures in the two sectors as well as to gauge the
sectoral differences in the various rates of return of a specific
background attribute such as a year of schooling or the acquisition
of a university degree. The fact that differences in estimated
rewards may not be readily ascribed to productivity-enhancing
background attributes, makes a priori evidence that one or another
group of workers enjoy a wage premium that may or may not be
adequate for its skill level.

However, there is much variation in both the direction and
magnitude of the estimated wage advantage. Mazumdar (1981) in
Malaysia found that primary school wages in the public sector are
lower than those in the private sector. University graduates enjoy
higher premium in public sector employment in Cote d'Ivoire over
their counterparts in the private sector as Komenan (1987)
discovered. In Columbia, Psacharopoulos, Aniagada and Velez
(1987) have shown that education rather than work experience and
productivity pay in private sector employment. Psacharopoulos
(1983) while studying Brazil, Greece, Malaysia, Columbia and
Portugal discovered that except for Greece, returns to education,
productivity and experience are higher in the private sector than in
the public sector.
Thus, whereas highly educated workers in the public sector
do not have a wage advantage, in the private sector, less educated
workers do have a wage premium. Steir (1987) confirms that in
Venezuela, average public sector wages are higher than private
sector wages at all levels except at the post secondary level. Most of
these studies consider the adequacy of the wage level to be a
relative factor of educational attainment but not a function of the
general level of economic development nor price levels.

2.2

Modeling Wages in Nigeria.

Olaloye (1976) modeled wage earnings in Nigeria's
manufacturing industries using Time Series data. Employing a two
variable formulation - the cost of living and level of productivity
gains, the researcher postulated that the present cost of living is
affected by past output. The form of equation and the appropriate
lag structure were however, said to be indeterminate in the
literature. The formulated equation was:
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W
f (Xi.k, P,.m}
Where:
Average wage earnings index in the Nigerian Manufacturing
We,
Industries;
X
Average Productivity (defined as value added per
employee) index in the Nigerian Manufacturing Industries;
P
Cost of Living Index
T
Time subscripts in years, and
k, m = Lags in Years
Estimating the equation in first difference at an appropriate
lag structure, and holding productivity constant, the author found a
positive relationship between the average wages and the previous
year's cost of living index. The same was established for
productivity and average wage earnings if the previous year's cost
of living index was held constant.
The main deficiency in Olaloye's (1976) estimation was the
smallness of his sample size. There were yearly variations in the
composition and coverage of establishments affected by the civil
war. These introduced noise and structural break in the data set,
leading to inconclusive results. No attempt was made to establish
wages in the public sector which, invariably, in all cases determine
the direction of wage level/flows in the economy. The observed
imperfections therefore, have given rise to the present study. This
study therefore, improves on Olaloye's approach especially in the
veracity and predictive ability of the model by increasing the sample
size, and the number of variables. The present study also proposes
a robust model with the aid of improved econometric methodology
which was used to test the determinants of wages in Nigeria.

SECTION THREE
WAGE DETERMINATION IN NIGERIA
3.0

Wage Administration in Nigeria

Across the board wage bargain institutions in the public
sector date to the early 1900s but formal institutionalization in form
of wage commission/committees was in the 1930s. The internal
machinery for bi-lateral public sector wage negotiation was first set
in motion by the 1946 Harragin commission but established by the
Cowan Commission of Enquiry of 1948 which introduced two
'Whitley Council', one for clerical and office employees and the
other for industrial or manual workers. These councils though
ineffective lasted on the statue books till 1964 when they were
replaced by Wages Boards upon the recommendation of the
Morgan Commission (1963). The wages Board were later
displaced by the National Negotiating Councils I, 11 , and Ill which
were introduceu by the 1973 Udoji Commission, inaugurated in
1976. The mandate of these councils was to negotiate salaries,
fringe benefits and general conditions of service for the public
service, but excluding partial and fully commercialized parastatals,
state owned companies and academic and non-academic
institutions (universities, research institutes, teaching hospitals,
and the like).
Wage fixing exercises in Nigeria have for long remained the
prerogative of the federal government which has carried out the
exercise through the use of wage commissions (Anyafo, 1996).
Thus, between 1941 and 1973, nine such commissions were set up
to routinely review public sector wages. These include: Bridges
Committee (1941), Tudor Davis Commission (1945) , Harragin
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Commission (1946) , Miller Committee (1947) , Gorsuch Committee
(1955), Mbanefo and Morgan Commissions (1959) , Morgan
Commission (1963) , Adebo Commission (1970) , Udoji
Commission (1973) .
Though the wage awards of these comm1ss1ons were
intended to apply to the public sector only, workers in the private
sector also took their queue from them. A usual feature of a typical
wage award in Nigeria is incessant strike by workers, owing to
widespread attempts by employees in the private sector (or even in
the public sector especially the state and local government
authorities who refuse to effect such awards) to raise their pay in
tandem with those of government employees. Also, such wage
increases were usually effected as a spur of the moment, not having
been previously provided for in the budget of the year in which they
became effective. In effect, the implementation of such wage
increases led to overshooting the boundaries of fiscal discipline,
increased inflation , loss of productivity and consequently, national
income arising from accompanying labour unrest in agitation for
paymentofthe new wage.
The factors which influenced the growth in remuneration
packages in the 1920s through 1950s were the expansion of public
utilities such as potable water, electricity, housing anr! a relatively
integrated transportation system (marine, rail , and road), as well as
exploration and mining activities. These activities which bred a pool
of skilled and semi-skilled artisans, through formal and informal
training systems influenced public sector compensation in the
country (FOS:1998).
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SECTION FOUR
4.0

Methodology

4.1

DATA JUSTIFICATION
Trade Disputes

The variable measures amongst others, macroeconomic
uncertainties associated with wage administration as a barometer
for gauging wage insufficiency to attain a decent standard of living,
social unrest and discontentment. The data was obtained from the
Federal Ministry of Employment, Labour and Productivity under the
heading Trade Disputes. It is the number of trade disputes declared
by labour in the year.
Productivity

The data on productivity used was gross national productivity
as reported by Obadan and Odusola (2000). A theoretical link exist
between per capita income and the marginal productivity of labour.
Thus, an economy's national productivity is defined as :
GNP/Population. This was adopted as proxy for public sector
productivity.
Average Wage Earnings

The wage system in Nigeria is a stratified wage. It is broadly
classified into two categories, senior and junior. The wage data
which was obtained from the National productivity Centre, Federal
Ministry of Employment, Labour and Productivity and the Federal
Office of Statistics (FOS) was therefore so classified. For purposes
of the study, wages at each category was first considered
separately. Thus, wages within each bracket were considered
66
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separately and thereafter averaged for that category. Thereafter, the
two categories were added and a national average obtained.
Interest Rates

This was used in its strict economic meaning as the cost of
capital. The rate used was the Prime Lending Rate. The data was
obtained at the Central bank of Nigeria.
Money Supply (M2)

This is defined as currency outside banks plus demand
deposits. Data used was as published by the CBN.
Work Experience

This is defined as the man days worked. Data used was
obtained from the CBN Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 1O No. 2, December
1999.
4.2

Estimation and Analysis

Olaloye's model was tested using OLS methodology with
quarterly data from 1970 to 1998 but it yielded unsatisfactory
results. The procedure employed in this study involved an enlarged
variable model using an error correction methodology. Our findings
revealed that the level of education was not a major determinant of
public sector wages in Nigeria. The methodology was used to
estimate the model because for a sample size, the OLS
methodology though less sensitive to misspecification error than
the simultaneous estimation procedures, was inappropriate
because it produced no reliable results. Most of the variables met a
priori expectations, except for the lagged consumer price index
(CPI). When plotted, the relationship produced a long-run
relationship amongst the co-integrating variables.
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4.3

The Wage Model for Nigeria

The Average Wage which is the average price for labour in the
public sector is used as the dependent variable. Using the lagged
dependent model we define the dynamic autoregressive model
using the Marc Nerlove Partial Adjustment Approach , an improved
variant of the Koyck distributed lag model, which portrays the time
path of the dependent variable in relation to its past values.
Applying the flexible accelerator approach , which assumes
the existence of an equilibrium, optimal, desired or long-run
equilibrium wage needed to produce a certain level of output under
given fundamentals, and assuming that this desired wage is a linear
function of other explanatory variables such as Trade Disputes,
Consumer Price Index, Interest Rate, Productivity, Money Supply,
and Previous Work Experience, we can then specify the linear form
of the equation as follows :
~t

= a o + a 1(Pi) + a 2(II1) + a3(~J + a 4( y.,) + as(Oi) + a6(E>1.1) +(Ei) ..... ... (1)

Where:

0t

Average Wage Earnings at Time t
Trade Disputes at time t
CPI attimet
Interest Rates at time t
Productivity at time t
Money Supply aftime t
Previous Work Experience at time t-1

E

Error Term
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Equation (1) is the long-run or equilibrium wage. Due to the
difficulty of observing the desired wage, Nerlove (1963), postulated
the Partial Adjustment Hypothesis discussed in Appendix II. The
resulting wage model from the partial adjustment hypothesis would
be is of the form:
= loga0 + a, log( pJ + a2 log(IIJ + aplog( /JJ + ai5Iog(y") ·'
a5olog (n J + a6olog(0 1• 1) + (1- o)logd 1_1 + o(E J•···························· ,-,

log

1

Under this approach, the estimated parameters representthe
rate of change in the level or elasticity of the explanatory variables
including the level of Trade Disputes (a1) , consumer prices-CPI (C¼),
Interest Rates (a3), Productivity (a4) , Money Supply (a5) and
Previous Work Experience (8.i,). A priori, the signs of the parameters
are: a 1.a2 , a3 , a4 , a5 ,and a6 > 0.
In view of the problems associated with the partial,
adjustment hypothesis, the error correction framework, which is an
improvement over Nerlove (1963) specification is adopted for this
study. The nonlinear least squares estimator of the equilibrium
correction model has the following properties as shown by Stock
(1987), which are lacking in the partial adjustment framework. It is a
super-consistent estimator of the long-run coefficients. Also, it is a
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed estimator of the
coefficients of the I(0) terms. The econometric package employed
in the estimation was views 4.

4.4

Results and Major Findings

The results of the static regression are presented in Table 1
based on a unit root test, conducted on the log values of the
explanatory variables, as shown in Table 2. All the 'v:'ariables were
integrated of order 2.
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Results of the static model are presented in Table 1.
Table 1
RESULTS FROM STATIC REGRESSION

Variable

Coefficient

Standard
Error

CONSTANT

-0.060048

0.207151

-0.289874

0.7725

Lp,

0.083690

0.01 9292

4.338022

0.0000

LII.

0.486584

0.0641 62

7.583636

0.0000

Lil,.,

-0.420379

0.06481 7

-6.485587

0.0000

L0 ..,

0.062550

0.01 7468

3.580858

0.0005

LO,.,

0.888633

0.030844

28.81045

0.0000

2

t-statistic

Probability

2

R = 0.995983, AdjR = 0.995799, OW = 1.685981 , Log Likelihood = 168.4828, Akaike Inf.
Grit. = -2.825788, F. Stat. = 5405.417, Prob(F-Stat) = 0.000000

This gives us our long-run equation as:

0, 0.060 + 0.084( pJ + 0.487(IIJ - 0 .420(11 + 0 .063(0
1• 1 )

_ )
11

+ 0.889(0

_ ) ••••
11

(3)

Although the stationarity of the variables may dispense with
the problem of spurious regression, however, the coefficients of the
regression don't converge in probability with increasing sample
size, as the constant diverges. Consequently, both the regression
2
coefficients and the R have non-degenerate distributions. Thus, the
test diverges so that there are no asymptotically correct critical
values for these conventional significance tests, and the DW test
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g
z

8z
0

~

(')

R-

Table 2

:!l
z
>

UNIT ROOT TEST OF THE VARIABLES

Cl
>

z
r

Variable**

~

Critical Values for
ADF Test

ADF
Test Statistic

~

Order of Integration

<

0

0,

-2.8879

-6.933878

1

Pt

-2.8879

-7.802847

1

nit

-2.8879

-6.496882

1

D/Jt

-2.8879

-6.625881

1

Y,
n,

-2.8879

-6.861061

1

-2.8879

-7.599730

1

e.

-2.8879

-8.420121

1

The ADF Test Statistic is at 5 % level of significance. The ADF Test was without trend,
but included an intercept.

~

All variables are in their log form and are I{ 1}, at the 2"1 lag length

...r

!"'

zp

converges to zero (Granger-Newbold:1974). Following Granger
and Newbold (1974), the ADF unit Root Test on the residual shows
that there is co integrating relationship amongst the variables as
such, they are correctly associated in the long run. The residual
term for our test defined as <I> is of the form:
..6.<I> = ao+ a,<I>(-1)

+ 82.ll(<I> (-1) .... ....... ............................................... .... (4)

And the Residual test yielded the results presented in Table 3 below.
Table 3
RESULTS OF RESIDUAL TEST
Standard
Variable

2

Coefficient

Error

t-statistic

Probability

CONSTANT 0.001106

0.005992

0.184498

0.8540

<1>(-1)

-2.889241

0.403692

-7.1 57051

0.0000

~d> (-1)

1.217138

0.352902

3.448944

0.0008

2

R = 0.764562, AdjR = 0.753133, OW= 2.032655, Log Likelihood = 150.6015,
Akaike Inf. Crit. = -2.653239, F. Stat.

= 66.89637, Prob(F-Stat) = 0.000000

Our Error Correction Model is of the form:
£12 1/), =Bo+ a#p, + apn, + sP/3, +apv, +asA2 n, + aa~ 2 0,.,+aa<I>,., ....................... (5)

Where <l> t., = rest-1 = Residual,
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Table 4
RESULTS OF THE ERROR CORRECTION REGRESSION
Standard
Error
Variable

Coefficient

t-statistic

Probability

CONSTANT

0.000938

0.006880

0.136332

0.8918

Lp,

0.12711 7

0.025271

5.030164

0.0000

Ln,

0.484025

0.061501

7.870145

0.0000

Ln,.,

-3.316966

0.133310

-2.377666

0.0192

L ,.,

0.639214

0.245988

2.598557

0.0107

L0,.,

0.038722

0.025271

5.030164

0.0000

<I> Tt

-0.605133

0.265989

-2.275027

0.0249

R2 = 0.458270, AdjR2 = 0.427893, OW = 1.972275, Log Likelihood = 170.4636, Akaike Inf. Grit. =
-2.867783, Schwarz Inf. Cri -2.70, F. Stat. = 15.08590, Prob(F-Stat) = 0.000000

The results of the model is presented as:

0

1

= 0.009 + o.13p 1 + o.4an ,- 3.32/3,.1+ o.G4Y•.1+ o.o4n •-1-o.s10 •.1·
Analysis of the Results

Trade Disputes was highly statistically significant, met a priori
expectations. The variable addresses amongst other issues,
macroeconomic uncertainties associated with wage administration
in Nigeria, insufficiency of wages to live a decent standard of living,
political considerations, social pressure and discontentment with
policies amongst others. At 5 per cent level of significance, the null
hypothesis of a Zero coefficient of trade disputes is rejected. This is
an indication that trade dispute induce significant positive wage
changes and wage policies in Nigeria. Thus, a unit change in trade
disputes induces a 0.13 per cent wage change. Its inelasticity
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shows how inadequate is the level of wages change. Its inelasticity
shows how inadequate is the level of wages to meet basic needs.
Therefore, the more often and persistent is trade dispute, leading to
work stoppages, the better for employees because they will have
more time for freelancing and moonlighting.
The CPI with at-statistic of 7.87 is also significant at the 5 per
cent level. It met a priori expectations showed signs of moderate
elasticity. A unit change in prices induces a 0.48 percent increase in
wages. Thus, the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient that changes
in price levels have no effect on wage levels is rejected . lnfact,
growth in the price level with wages held constant would induce
demand for higher wages.
The one period lagged CPI was very elastic and statistically
significant at 5 per cent level of significance, but it had a wrong sign.
With an elasticity of greater than unity, a unit change in last quarter's
prices induce a more than proportionate change in current wages.
It gives us reason to reject the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient of
the lagged inflation rate and to accept the alternate that the one
period lagged inflation is instrumental at the 5% level of significance
in affecting current wages. The wrong sign could be explained in
terms of the leaning against the wind response of government to
demands for higher wages when there is perceived rise in the price
level.
Previous Work Experience proved to be statistically
significant at 5 per cent level, and met a priori expectations. This is
an indication that public sector wage policies recognize recent work
experience acquired as is the case with the more austere private
sector which uses wage increases to compensate highly skilled
labour, and for purposes of personnel motivation. Thus, changes in
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previous work experience are complemented by 0.04 per cent
increased wages. This inelasticity may explain the causes of
personnel attrition to the more austere private sector.
The lagged dependent variable performed creditably, being
statistically significant and meeting a priori expectations. Thus,
current wages are highly sensitive to previous wage levels.
Consequently, a unit change in previous wages raise current wages
by as much as 0.64 per cent.

/

The main gaps in the paper include the discrete nature of
public sector wages, the non-inclusion of non-monetary benefits
enjoyed by certain office holders in the public sector, the influence
of extraneous factors such as the personal disposition of an
incumbent leader to wage matters. These issues present
challenges for further research.
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SECTION V
Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations
5.1

Concluding Remarks

The major findings of the study are that the main determinants of
wages in Nigeria are: Trade Disputes, Price Levels, Previous Work
Experience, and the Level of Previous Wages. The low elasticities of
trade disputes confirms the inadequacy of wages which induced
moonlighting activities, freelancing, bribery and corruption, in order
to generate additional income to meet the cost of living. The very
high elasticity of prices on the other hand indicate a more than
proportionate reaction of wages to changes in prices. The low
elasticity of previous work experience indicate that compensation
policies, though take cognizance of previous work experience, are
not based on recently acquired experience which gives rise to
personnel attrition and moonlighting activities. Also, both lagged
inflation and lagged dependent variable are instrumental to wage
changes in Nigeria. Exchange rate, productivity, interest rate and
money supply, however, do not directly influence wage changes.
5.2

Policy Recommendations
As rising price levels heighten the demand for higher wages,
which if not met leads to trade disputes and fall in output, it is
recommended that policies that moderate price levels be
conscientiously pursued to stem spiral price movement. This will
ensure a more pragmatic and equitable compensation system
which recognizes productivity and adequacy of the wage to meet
basic standard of living. This will encourage hard work and reduce
the incidence of absentee employees who freelance in search of
alternative income to compensate for inadequate wages. We also
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recommend a restructuring of the public sector wage system such
that the employee is paid a clean wage (monetizing accrued
benefits) , given marginal tax rates. The pension scheme which has
become unrealistic should also be reviewed with a view to building
into the model, cost of living adjustment and aging consideraions.
This may take care of personnel attrition and freelancing labour,
which impacts on labour efficiency and output.
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APPENDIX I
TEST FOR COINTEGRATION
The cointegration test was carried out based on the rules specified
by Engle and Granger (1991) that the components of the vector x,
are said to be cointegrated of orderd, b, denoted X,-Cl(d,b), if:
(I)
(ii)

all components of~ are l(d)
there exists a vector a(0) so that Zi = a'x/ l(d-b). Then, the
vector a is called the cointegrating vector.

Hannan (1970) has shown that if each component of Xi, is 1(1)
so that the change in each component is a zero mean purely nondeterministic stationary stochastic process, then it follows that
there will always exist a multivariate wold representation of the form
(I-B)Xi = C(B)e" indicating both sides of the equation will have the
same special matrix. Also, C(B) will be specially defined given the
conditions that the relationship C(Z) , Z = e \ have all zeros on or
outside the unit circle, and that C(0) = IN, NxN matrix.
From the above representations, the e1 are zero mean white
noise vectors with

E(e1 es) = 0, t = s
= G, t = s
Thus, only contemporaneous correlations can occur. The
moving average polynomial C(B) can be shown as:
C(B) = C(1) + (1-B)C*(B). Consequently, if c(B) is finite, then C*(B)
will be finite by rearranging the terms. If C*(1) = 0, then, we can
similarly refine (1-b)2.
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APPENDIX II
NERLOVE'S PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT FRAMEWORK

The mare Nerlove Partial Adjustment framework is a
preceding alternative procedure over the error correction
methodology, and an improvement over the Koyck distributed lag
model, which potrays the time path of the dependent variable in
relation to its past value. Thus, using the lagged dependent model
we define the dynamic autoregressive model as:

0
•

I =

•

a o + a ,(P,) + a 2(n), + 33(~.) + a. (Y11) + a s(ll,) + a s(Eli.,) + (t;) ................ (1)
.!.

•

•

0,·01-1 =u(0 •·0 ,.,) ....................................................................................... (2)
The
model
may
also be specified as:
•
•
.!. •
.
0 ,-0,.1 =u(0 ,.0 ,.,)....................................................................................(2)
Where:
o, is coefficient of adjustmentO <
Thus, equation (1) implies that actual change in wages in any time
t is some fraction '0 of the desired change for that period. If o =1 ,
it means the actual level of wages is equal to the desired level i.e
actual level adjusting instantaneously with the desired level in the
same time period. However, if c5 =0, it means no change has
occurred since the actual level at time t is the same with that
observed in the previous time period. t-1 . is expected to lie
between these two extreme since adjustment to the desired wage is
likely to be incomplete because of rigidity, inertia, contractual
obligations, and other extraneous considerations. We can therefore
define the adjustment mechanism as:
11 11

1

11

.
.
"' ................................................................................. (4)
0,=o
0*,.o
c1-o .,"',.,
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Indicating that the obseNed wage at time tis a weighted average of
the desired wage at the time and the wage existing in the previous
time period, oand (1-o) being the weights.
Substituting equation (1) in equation (4) produces equation (5)
which is of the form:
Vt= o (mo+ ce1xt +i t+ (1-o) yt-1

= omo + oce1xt + i t +(1-o) yt-1 + oi:t.............................................. (5)

Equation (5) is the short-run wage function ; hence, the short-run
wage may not necessarily be equal to the long-run wage.
Estimating the short-run wage function produces the adjustment
coefficient o ( from the coefficient of yt-1), we then derive the longrun function by dividing oreo and ore1 by a and omitting the lagged
Y term which produces equation (1) above.
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